Thievery Corporation

A Book Review of The Caesars Palace Coup: How a Billionaire Brawl Over the Famous Casino Exposed the Power and Greed of Wall Street (2021)

"Many shall be restored that now are fallen, and many shall fall that now are in honor." - Horace—Ars Poetica.

Thug (noun): "a violent, aggressive person, especially one who is a criminal." - Merriam-Webster Dictionary

Around 2009, I was a junior staff member at a major global investment bank and earned a big early promotion. After the promotion, I was invited to attend a special meeting. The firm's executive leaders met once a year in person at headquarters in New York for an all-day strategy session. It was basically a multi-hour debate about the future of the firm. I was to take notes.

On the top floor of a Manhattan skyscraper, the executives sat around the perimeter of a large, square conference table with its center cut out, allowing attendees to face each other across the open middle. From my perch at a side table next to the group, it was riveting to be a fly on the wall as the bank’s leaders plotted a way forward after the Global Financial Crisis. Most executives in the room that day, already at the pinnacle of Wall Street, have since moved on to lead other firms. One moment from that day stuck in my mind.

The group was discussing what to do about Goldman Sachs. Goldman was its rival in all things, and at the time, skated through the meltdown on Wall Street without as much trouble as competitors and with a lot of additional wealth.

In the room that day with me, one of the executives — a quietly intense, cerebral man with a sphinxlike demeanor not known for showing even an ounce of emotion — summed up his perspective on Goldman in a few unexpected words: "They are thugs. They are shrewd thugs, but make no mistake, they are thugs." 

He then turned to me with a cold stare — the first time I'd even been glanced at all day — and said, "Don't write that down." Everyone else laughed. He did not.

I've thought about that moment often since then. The principal competitor to Goldman, who was no slouch at extracting wealth from markets, said what The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, and others wouldn't say so plainly. In a few years, the broader world would embrace that thuggish view of Goldman. And you can read about it in brilliant detail in books like Billion Dollar Whale (2018) (affiliate link) or in recent stories about its embattled CEO. Since then, Goldman's luster and stock market valuation have somewhat faded, sparked by ill-conceived and ill-executed strategic choices.

Reading between the lines in the business press daily then, I was less surprised with his opinion of Goldman than that he, a man almost immune to hyperbole and glib speech, said it so matter of factly. Perhaps it's helpful to remember the history and original meaning of the word "thug," i.e., before it was warmly used in rap songs as a sign of endearment or coldly repurposed as a racist figure of speech toward Black Americans. The term "thug" traces its origins to the Hindi word "ṭhag," which signifies a "swindler" or "deceiver." Historically linked to the Thuggee cult in India, known for their heinous acts of robbery and murder, the word was later adopted into the English language, evolving to its contemporary meaning of a violent or aggressive individual.

The way the word "thug" was used that day was the traditional dictionary meaning based on this historical context. However, the violence suggested was not physical but financial. He was not encouraging the firm to become thugs like their rival but to be wary of them.

I share this reflection not because the book in question is about Goldman. But because it's about another Wall Street firm that in the same period of American history looked like it could not lose, yet also found sharp rebukes in boardrooms and courtrooms and a partial comeuppance afterward: Apollo Global Management.

It seems you would have to be a poor reader, ignorant, or maybe an avowed thief to finish The Caesars Palace Coup (affiliate link) and not conclude that Apollo was a thievish organization. The book’s authors are the well-regarded journalists Max Frumes and Sujeet Indap. It is about how Apollo, a private equity firm, used a gargantuan amount of debt to overpay massively for the Las Vegas-based Caesar casino and entertainment complex on the brink of the Financial Crisis. Then, while facing default, tried to rob their creditors of their rights to take possession of the property. Some of those creditors fought back. The creditors’ lawyers summed up their perspective on Apollo in a 200-page legal filing from which Frumes and Indap quote and then spend the rest of the book essentially confirming. In that filing, Apollo is described as having perpetuated "unimaginably brazen looting and corporate abuse" that "devised a scheme to cheat creditors of their rightful recoveries." Moreover, "the fox has not only been put in charge of the hen house; it has barricaded the door and has even paid itself a salary."

Yikes. But also, excellent writing for a 200-page legal filing. More importantly, yikes.

Was Apollo shrewd? Not really. They come across as aggressive and relentlessly conniving but not that smart. Nor do their advisors. The book is essentially about ethically shifty wealthy businessmen trying to intimidate other wealthy businessmen through highly paid lawyers and advisors but finding out the quality of lawyers and advisors is often divorced from the size of their paychecks. Take this scene for example: There's one part about three-quarters of the way through the book where we learn a top executive at Houlihan Lokey, a preeminent firm in the field of corporate restructuring, under oath admitted he had no idea what the term "intrinsic value" meant and had never heard of Benjamin Graham and David Dodd or the book Security Analysis (affiliate link). If you don't know what I'm talking about, that's totally okay. You probably are one of my many non-finance friends or never worked on Wall Street and will still get a holiday card from me. But if you did work on Wall Street and rose to become the head of a powerful restructuring firm and don't know this — yikes. 

If a book on this topic sparks your curiosity, I'd also recommend The Code of Capital: How the Law Creates Wealth and Inequality (2019) by Katharina Pistor (affiliate link). She provides helpful historical and analytical lenses about how private interests and public legal systems enable the creation and preservation of power. The philosophical treatise of her book aligns well with the anecdotes, interviews, and evidence that propel the narrative in Frumes and Indap’s story.

What is permissible in the world and passes as power and the law isn’t handed down from Olympus. It often isn’t even created by humanity’s wisest souls. It’s typically hacked together behind closed doors by people, too often men, using iterative relationship games, F.O.M.O., questionable interpretations of fine print, and social proof to intimidate other people into joining — or at least not interrupting — their schemes. Every now and then, however, we see the rare counter-power of fearless, truly great thinkers make hay of those shenanigans. This book tells such a story.


Godfrey M. Bakuli is the Founder of Pioneer Strategy Group (PSG), which offers expert strategic advice and actionable execution plans to R&D and marketing leaders looking to identify, de-risk, and launch innovative business ventures. He is also the Founder and Managing Partner of
The Mutoro Group, an investment firm employing a patient, disciplined, and rational approach to fundamental value investing. If you’d like to learn more about Pioneer Strategy Group, please email us at info@pioneerstrategy.co or through the link below.



Restoration Innovation

My first core memory of the concept of “furniture” is pretty humble.

As a toddler, my family immigrated to a small town in Massachusetts from Kenya. This was in the 1980s, and though I didn’t know it at the time, being not yet three years old, we arrived with little financial resources by the American standard. As my parents saved money to purchase furniture for their growing family, I shared a queen-sized bed at night with my two older brothers, ages 4 and 8. I had to sleep in the middle because I would occasionally wet the bed, and my brothers needed a margin of safety such that if my bladder failed me in the middle of the night, they could leap to safety.

When my parents finally scrounged up the money to purchase each of their children their own beds, I distinctly remember the joy. It felt as though I were really going places in the world despite still being in my toddlerhood. Henceforth when I had an accident, I wouldn’t hear gripes about it.

Though I would learn the term formally many years later, intuitively, I grasped a central concept of the idea of “luxury:” Something exclusively your own.

Times have changed. Or have they?

I share this as I reflect on a recent fascinating earnings call I listened to. Sitting in my New York apartment decades later, I have access to more “luxury” products and services that are my own than I could have ever imagined. But that hasn’t stopped entrepreneurs from introducing new ones.

Of the dozens of corporate earnings calls I listen to each month, I happened upon one that was unlike anything in recent memory and sent me down this path of reflection. It was from RH, the company formally known as Restoration Hardware. RH is a luxury American home-furnishing company providing various high-end products, including furniture, textiles, and rugs. The call was led by their long-time Chief Executive Officer, Gary Friedman. While most corporate quarterly earnings calls made public are between 30 to 60 minutes in length, this RH call was nearly two hours. It was fascinating throughout for its unexpectedness.

While I invest in luxury companies through personal and investment vehicles, I don’t currently have a financial position in RH. I was more interested in listening to the sorts of questions analysts were asking Friedman so I could understand more about the company and its likely direction. I found myself compelled by what he was saying. It was part visionary bombast, part market strategy session, and part locker-room motivational speech. It was as though you had asked a generative AI to impersonate Gordon Bombay addressing the Mighty Ducks in the style of a Richard Branson lecture on innovation. In setting the ambition for RH, Friedman also used an analogy about mountain climbing, which I’m partial to as an avid hiker. From Friedman’s remarks:

Taste can be elusive, and we believe no one is better positioned than RH to create an ecosystem that makes taste inclusive and, by doing so, elevating and rendering our way of life more valuable.

Climbing the Luxury Mountain and Building a Brand with No Peer: Every luxury brand, from Chanel to Cartier, Louis Vuitton to Loro Piana, Harry Winston to Hermès, was born at the top of the luxury mountain. Never before has a brand attempted to make the climb to the top, nor do the other brands want you to. We have a deep understanding that our work has to be so extraordinary that it creates a forced reconsideration of who we are and what we are capable of, requiring those at the top of the mountain to tip their hat in respect. We also appreciate that this climb is not for the faint of heart, and as we continue our ascent the air gets thin, and the odds become slim. We believe the level of work we plan to introduce this year inclusive of our new Collections, new Source Book design, new Gallery design and the introduction of RH to the UK in an immersive and unforgettable fashion, will continue to demonstrate the imagination, determination, creativity and courage of this team, and the relentless pursuit of our dream.

Over 20 years ago we began the journey with a vision of transforming a nearly bankrupt business with a $20 million market cap and a box of Oxydol laundry detergent on the cover of the catalog into the leading luxury home brand in the world. The lessons and learnings, the passion and persistence, the courage required, and the scar tissue developed by getting knocked down 10 times and getting up 11 leads to the development of the mental and moral strength that builds character in individuals and forms cultures in organizations. Lessons that can’t be learned in a classroom, or by managing a business, lessons that must be earned by building one, or, by reaching the top of the mountain.

Onward Team RH.

Carpe diem, Gary.

Ducks Fly Together.

There’s much worth unpacking from this and the rest of the call. A lot of the bravado and ambition seem borne from fact, while some seem too hopeful and unmoored from reality. Let’s reflect on both sides of the coin.

First, some facts about the origin of RH. Friedman joined the company in 2001 when it was struggling and almost bankrupt. The brand, founded in 1979 in California, had established itself as a niche seller of period hardware, but over the next twenty years, had overweighted itself unprofitably through selling novelty items. When Friedman joined, he began offering more upscale and unique furnishings and reduced sales of tchotchkes. Additionally, Friedman built out impressive, massive “Galleries” as store fronts and started offering comprehensive interior design services to customers, creating an end-to-end luxury home furnishing experience. This was a key part of the company's transformation from a simple retailer to a luxury lifestyle brand and helped grow its operating margins from single digit percentages to the low 20s.

That said, some things seem untrue about its ambitions. When Friedman says, “Never before has a brand attempted to make the climb to the top, nor do the other brands want you to;” that statement is only accurate if one ignores American luxury companies such as Esteé Lauder, Tesla, and Apple, which all started from the bottom and rose to the top of their industries globally. We can perhaps let this slide, though, as CEO-pattern-overselling. More fascinating, though, is Friedman’s claim that the company “makes taste inclusive.”

Was 3-year-old Godfrey wrong? Is luxury not exclusive? Elsewhere in the call, Friedman provides more perspective on this thought:

RH Business Vision & Ecosystem - The Long View: We believe, “There are those with taste and no scale, and those with scale and no taste,” and the idea of scaling taste is large and far reaching.

Our goal to position RH as the arbiter of taste for the home has proven to be both disruptive and lucrative, as we continue our quest to build the most admired brand in the world.

Our brand attracts the leading designers, artisans and manufacturers, scaling and rendering their work more valuable across our integrated platform, enabling RH to curate the most compelling collection of luxury home products on the planet.

Friedman believes RH can scale taste and serve as a network hub that attracts both designers and consumers. And he claims this is disruptive. Because PSG provides innovation consulting services, whenever I read the word “disruptive,” my ears tingle. Who or what is being disrupted?

On a recent episode of the Colossus podcast “Business Breakdowns,” Drew Cohen of Speedwell Research provides some perspective on RH:  

I think to understand the business model, we need to understand the context of the industry. Most people who are refurbishing their home, especially at the high end, the first thing they do is they hire an interior designer. And so then that interior designer is responsible for showing on different furniture retailers, different styles that are out there. If you think about the customer journey in purchasing, say a sofa, the first thing most people do is they're already outsourcing that decision to an interior designer right off the bat.

The interior designers themselves, they make money not just off of hourly fees, but they actually mark up the items themselves. So they're almost resellers for the manufacturer. And to make this work, the manufacturer gives them a discount if they have a trade license as it's called. So it's this weird setup where you can actually access the showrooms. You're not allowed in. Even if you were allowed in, all of the price tags are coded, so you can't read them.

And then the interior designer gets this big discount, it's usually -- it could be as much as 50%, but you don't know that. And then they're marking it up. There's a lot of price opacity. So you're not really sure how much you're really paying your interior designer. So that's the backdrop. And Gary said about changing this, maybe not initially, but this is where they ended up. So this is how he improved on this experience and really tried to move to being able to do luxury at scale.

Strategic kudos to RH. Their disruptive strategy is classic disintermediation. And it doesn’t stop there.

In 2015 they started a membership model where for $175 a year, their customers received a flat 25% discount across their entire product portfolio. Their 2015 Annual Report explained that this had the added benefit of moving “our primary business away from its traditional reliance on promotions and discounts.” Essentially RH took the furtive interior designer discount that had been standard across the industry and re-gifted it to their consumers. But using a membership model, they made that incentive conditional to ensure the consumers who benefited from it also funded it. Smart.

This seems disruptive to an analog market built on relationships and obfuscation, even if it’s for the benefit of people who spend $30,000 on ottomans. But is it genuinely inclusive and at scale? Friedman explains the strategy:

Our strategy is to move the brand beyond curating and selling product to conceptualizing and selling spaces, by building an ecosystem of Products, Places, Services and Spaces that establishes the RH brand as a global thought leader, taste and place maker.

Our products are elevated and rendered more valuable by our architecturally inspiring Galleries, which are further elevated and rendered more valuable by our interior design services and seamlessly integrated hospitality experience.

Our hospitality efforts will continue to elevate the RH brand as we extend beyond the four walls of our Galleries into RH Guesthouses, where our goal is to create a new market for travelers seeking privacy and luxury in the $200 billion North American hotel industry. Additionally, we are creating bespoke experiences like RH Yountville, an integration of Food, Wine, Art & Design in the Napa Valley, RH1 and RH2, our private jets, and RH3, our luxury yacht that is available for charter in the Caribbean and Mediterranean where the wealthy and affluent visit and vacation. These immersive experiences expose new and existing customers to our evolving authority in architecture, interior design and landscape architecture.

This leads to our long-term strategy of building the world’s first consumer-facing architecture, interior design and landscape architecture services platform inside our Galleries, elevating the RH brand and amplifying our core business by adding new revenue streams while disrupting and redefining multiple industries.

Our strategy comes full circle as we begin to conceptualize and sell spaces, moving beyond the $170 billion home furnishings market into the $1.7 trillion North American housing market with the launch of RH Residences, fully furnished luxury homes, condominiums and apartments with integrated services that deliver taste and time value to discerning time-starved consumers.

The entirety of our strategy comes to life digitally with The World of RH, an online portal where customers can explore and be inspired by the depth and dimension of our brand.

Our authority as an arbiter of taste will be further amplified when we introduce RH Media, a content platform that will celebrate the most innovative and influential leaders who are shaping the world of architecture and design.

Seven. I counted seven new business ventures in Friedman’s remarks. The future is unwritten, and it's possible RH will succeed in scaling its taste in these various areas. Today, I’m doubtful. Even when companies decide to build new products and services in adjacent or white space markets that address unmet consumer needs, focus is still necessary. Particularly to do the necessary grunt work to overcome the profitable value chains of entrenched competitors. Today, 70% of RH’s revenue comes from furniture sales. Managing a media platform, an online portal, fully furnished luxury home sales, multiple jets, a yacht, a Napa Valley retreat, and a hotel offering seems a lot for any company to do. Unless, of course, RH sees these seven as purely customer acquisition channels. Then, sure, it can form partnerships and a toehold in all seven, without this being quixotic or innovation theater. But if they expect to compete, their efforts would be better spent focused on fewer directions.

PSG is known for tackling some of the hardest future market sizing problems; so when Friedman describes the potential size of this ambition, I grew more doubtful about the true extent of this scale and inclusivity:

Our plan to expand the RH ecosystem globally multiplies the market opportunity to $7 trillion to $10 trillion, one of the largest and most valuable addressed by any brand in the world today. A 1% share of the global market represents a $70 billion to $100 billion opportunity.

In 2022, RH had revenues of $3.6 billion, down 4.5% from 2021. They are expanding to Europe but today focus primarily on the United States. It is number 802 on the Fortune 1000. Growing revenue to between $70 billion to $100 billion would put RH in line with revenue at companies such as Walt Disney, Goldman Sachs, and PSG partner PepsiCo. This is possible but unlikely. Firstly, from the lack of disruptive focus mentioned earlier, but secondly, when Friedman explains how they plan to expand internationally:

So, we look at the world differently than I think most people before us and historically have looked at a global expansion. I mean, we kind of look at countries in Europe like states in the United States, suppose, except there's -- the borders are different. There's some uniqueness there. But we've run our business very well in North America. And from our view, we're building really a global leadership team and kind of a global organization that will lead and oversee the business in an identical way that we do in North America, except that there is some unique differences within the countries.

While I remain open-minded to any corporate entrepreneurship story, this raises some flags. New York is twice as far away from Cincinnati as Paris is from London but has far more similarities to the midwestern city in terms of currency, language, and culture than the two European capitals. A human-centric approach where you first try to understand the problem at a local level and cater to specific needs would be better than copying and pasting between international markets.

That aside, we should leave our analysis of RH on a positive note. While they may have a steep climb ahead in conquering the luxury mountain through disruptive innovation, they seem to be conducting their sustaining innovation well. From the Q&A:

Yes. In a lot of ways, it represents an aesthetic change and a freshening, you'll see us begin to evolve away from gray and create really the platform for where the goods are going. We've kind of ridden the gray wave for the last, I don't know, 14 years or so. And there's big cycles in product. People ask me a lot, "Hey, what's next? And how do you know what's next? And where do the trends come from?" And I like to say the trends in our business come from the dead. Generations pass away, their belongings go into estate sales, which feed the high end, which feed the antique markets—the antique market really is what drives the high-end interior design market, then that goes into the high-end reproduction market and then it starts to trickle down from there.

It's hard to argue that RH's innovation engine and product development hasn’t worked. And it has many factors in its favor going forward. The 65-year-old Friedman is the company's largest individual shareholder and can align his vision with the company's strategic decisions and the trade-offs it chooses. That said, time will tell. In the interim, their core—while dealing with the same headwinds facing many companies selling durable goods to consumers in a high-interest rate environment—seems strong enough for them to continue to place innovative bets while competitors either stand still or fall away. Moreover, the history of luxury in America and abroad suggests companies that start high-end and then introduce products more accessible to the masses later do better than companies that start with mass products and try to move upscale. This will be a situation worth watching.

Godfrey M. Bakuli is the Founder of Pioneer Strategy Group (PSG), which offers expert strategic advice and actionable execution plans to R&D and marketing leaders looking to identify, de-risk, and launch innovative business ventures. He is also the Founder and Managing Partner of
The Mutoro Group, an investment firm employing a patient, disciplined, and rational approach to fundamental value investing. If you’d like to learn more about Pioneer Strategy Group, please email us at info@pioneerstrategy.co or through the link below.



Make It Till You Make It: A Zeitgeist Review

From a 1986 interview on 60 Minutes:

Mike Wallace: “So this show that’s just getting under way nationally.” 
Oprah Winfrey: “It’s going to do well.”
Mike Wallace: “And if it doesn’t?” 
Oprah Winfrey: “And if it doesn’t, I will still do well. I will do well because I’m not defined by a show. I think we are defined by the way we treat ourselves and the way we treat other people. I would be wonderful to be acclaimed as this talk show host who’s made it. That would be wonderful. But if that doesn’t happen, there are other important things in my life.”

From a 2010 interview on CNBC:

Warren Buffett: "They want the deal. And I’ve seen it so many times. If you really want the deal, you’ll have all the people that work for you telling you to do it. It’s team spirit. It’s winning. It really isn’t a win. Whenever a company makes a deal, I go to the store and I buy a congratulations card and I buy a sympathy card. And then five years later I decide which one to send.

This month, Erin Griffith, writing for The New York Times, dived into recent headlines out of Silicon Valley:

Faking it is over. That’s the feeling in Silicon Valley, along with some schadenfreude and a pinch of paranoia.

Not only has funding dried up for cash-burning start-ups over the last year, but now, fraud is also in the air, as investors scrutinize start-up claims more closely and a tech downturn reveals who has been taking the industry’s “fake it till you make it” ethos too far.

Take what happened in the past two weeks: Charlie Javice, the founder of the financial aid start-up Frank, was arrested, accused of falsifying customer data. A jury found Rishi Shah, a co-founder of the advertising software start-up Outcome Health, guilty of defrauding customers and investors. And a judge ordered Elizabeth Holmes, the founder who defrauded investors at her blood testing start-up Theranos, to begin an 11-year prison sentence on April 27.

The article leads with an image of Javice, the 31-year-old founder of Frank. Javice founded Frank in 2016 and sold the company to JPMorgan for $175 million in 2021. JPMorgan has sued Javice for fraud, and the Justice Department and FDIC recently unveiled a criminal complaint. From the complaint:

In or about 2021, JAVICE began to pursue the sale of Frank to a larger financial institution. Two major banks, one of which was [JPMorgan], expressed interest and began acquisition processes with Frank. JAVICE represented repeatedly to those banks that Frank had 4.25 million customers or “users.” […] In fact, Frank had less than 300,000 users.

When [JPMorgan] sought to verify the number of Frank’s users and the amount of data collected about them — information that was critical to [JPMorgan’s] decision to move forward with the acquisition process — JAVICE fabricated a data set. To do this, JAVICE […] first asked Frank’s director of engineering to create an artificially generated data set (a so-called synthetic data set). The director of engineering raised concerns about the legality of the request, to which JAVICE responded, in substance and in part, “We don’t want to end up in orange jumpsuits.” The director of engineering declined the request.

JAVICE then approached an outside data scientist and hired him to create the synthetic data set. […] In reliance on JAVICE’s fraudulent representations about Frank’s users, [JPMorgan] agreed to purchase Frank for $175 million. As part of the deal, [JPMorgan] hired JAVICE and other Frank employees. JAVICE received over $21 million for selling her equity stake in Frank and, per the terms of the deal, was to be paid another $20 million as a retention bonus.

Unbeknownst to [JPMorgan], at or about the same time that JAVICE was creating the fabricated data set, JAVICE […] sought to purchase, on the open market, real data for over 4.25 million college students to cover up their misrepresentations. JAVICE […] succeeded in purchasing a data set of 4.5 million students for $105,000, but it did not contain all the data fields that JAVICE had represented to [JPMorgan] were maintained by Frank. JAVICE then purchased an additional set of data on the open market in order to augment the data set of 4.5 million users. After [JPMorgan] acquired Frank, [JPMorgan] employees asked JAVICE […] to provide data relating to Frank’s users so that [JPMorgan] could begin a marketing campaign to those users. In response, JAVICE provided what was supposedly Frank’s user data. In fact, JAVICE fraudulently provided the data she […] had purchased on the open market at a small fraction of the price that [JPMorgan] paid to acquire Frank and its purported users.  

I reflected on Griffith’s article and the Javice case this weekend as I finished investor and writer Andrew Chen’s The Cold Start Problem (2021) (paid link). The book focuses on the challenges of launching and scaling products or platforms with network effects. These products or platforms often become more valuable as user numbers increase. The main obstacle is establishing an initial self-sustaining network that can attract users and maintain engagement. But even then, new obstacles emerge and growth challenges persist. I’ve seen this as a founder, investor, and advisor. Consider Facebook. A 3-billion-person behemoth today, it was once stuck at 100 million users years ago before it focused resources to break its plateau. Through examples like this, the book provides a helpful summary of Silicon Valley successes and failures over the last 30 years, from the demise of Usenet in the early 1990s to more recent companies like Slack and Uber.

Aware of recent news, Chapter 15 had my interest. It focuses on "Flintstoning," a method used to help “bootstrap content or to handhold new users initially." As Chen defines it:

In the classic 1960s animated sitcom The Flintstones, we see a prehistoric family sitcom set in the city of Bedrock. The show follows Fred and Wilma Flintstone and their loving family, complete with a pet dinosaur, a cave house, and a job that requires Fred to wear a tie. Memorably, there’s a car made of stone, furs, and timber—started up by a flurry of Fred’s legs—which rolls the family to their destination. Yabba dabba doo!

‘Flintstoning’ is a metaphor for this car, except in software, where missing product functionality is replaced with manual human effort. Early product releases often go into beta while lacking simple features like account deletion, content moderation tools, referral features, and many others. In lieu of these features, the product might simply offer way to contact the developers who will handle it manually for you, using tools they have in the back end. Once they get enough inquiries, eventually the feature gets built out and users can do it themselves. In the meantime, a Flintstoned product launch lets the developers get the app out into the market and get feedback from customers.

The focus of Chapter 15 is on Reddit, of which Chen’s firm, a16z, is an investor. Chen recounts a conversation with Reddit co-founder Steve Huffman, reflecting on the early days of solving their cold start problem:

No one wants to live in a ghost town. No one wants to join an empty community. In the early days, it was our job each day to make sure there was good content on the front page. We’d post it ourselves, using dozens of dummy accounts. Otherwise the community might dry up.

All of these dummy accounts looked and acted like real users, but it was Steve and [co-founder] Alexis [Ohanian] controlling them. And while in the early days it might require a lot of manual searching and posting of content, the two became more clever over time. They began to build software to help them scale this activity—which Steve describes:

I wrote some code that would scrape news websites and post them with made-up usernames. That way, it looked like there was an active community. Problem was, it still needed my attention—about a month after launch in July of that year, I went camping with my family and didn’t submit any links. When I checked Reddit, the homepage was blank! Whoops.

On one hand, the automation to scale their Flintstoning worked—Steve’s code helped find and submit interesting content from a number of different websites. But on the other hand, it was still dependent on him being involved and checking in. Nevertheless, it tided the Reddit network over until it was able to have enough organic content creators for Steve to lay off the dummy scripts entirely.

The above passage sparks some useful questions.

When do a founder’s actions go from Flintstoning to fraud? Are some founders just lucky not to get caught? When does “clever” become “criminal”?

The short, practical answer is that if you aren't sure you're doing the right thing, don't do it. We can come to a more helpful answer, though, comparing Frank and Reddit. Frank’s tactics seemingly differ from Reddit’s because – while opaque to users and misleading – Reddit's founders used those methods to start the operation, not sustain it. (As the company prepares for a possible IPO this year, one hopes management no longer puffs its user ranks with bots.) Moreover, Reddit’s backers seem to have been aware of their strategies. It's hard to imagine from the allegations about Javice that Frank's investors were equally supportive.

Fraud in start-ups isn't new and tends to increase when money flows abundantly, as it has over the last few years. Start-up mythology often leads founders to rationalize questionable decisions. At the same time, stakeholders may overlook misrepresentations due to venture capital's economic and social incentives. This culture can push founders to cross ethical boundaries and focus on traction and momentum instead of business model soundness.

Using crude math, if Frank’s actual user base was 300,000 instead of 4.25 million – and the sale price to JPMorgan reflected that – then the company might have sold for about $12 million instead of $175 million. While that might seem a great outcome, with $20 million in funds raised, one can see how having venture capital backing may have disincentivized that.

How can would-be strategic partners, investors, or employees identify whether they are working with a company that could be fraudulent or deceptive?

A recent episode of the excellent podcast The Journal explored one way. It focused on JPMorgan’s debacle with Frank. Here’s an excerpt from the conversation between co-host Kate Linebaugh and reporter Melissa Korn:

Melissa Korn: I spent many hours getting a better sense of what Frank was, what they promised to offer, what they actually offered. There were reviews on Frank's website years ago, in its early days, raving about the service and thanking Frank for all the great work they had done for these supposed customers. So this one, Kimberly Roberts of Wisconsin University, gushes that she sends "hundreds of my students and their families a year to Frank for guidance with the financial aid process." First of all, Wisconsin University doesn't exist, and I could find no trace of this person, Kimberly Roberts. There were a few like that.

Kate Linebaugh: And did you find anything else?

Melissa Korn: Yes, there were partnerships that didn't exist. In a TechCrunch feature on Frank in 2018, the piece said that in addition to working with students, the company partnered with New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas to manage their state aid programs. I reached out to the state aid programs in those three states, and none of them had any record of such partnerships. […] What also interests me is just how JPMorgan didn't notice what I see as some pretty significant red flags. Things that I found, just, I don't know, doing a search, looking at archived websites. I came across things that made me scratch my head a little bit.

Rather than solely blaming Frank for a deal gone bad, JPMorgan might want to look inward. During a very acquisitive 2021 for the bank, I would bet the unit within JPMorgan that made the acquisition felt some pressure to close a deal that, with hindsight, made no sense.

Several years ago, the investor Jim Chanos shared an insight that I believe also applies to dealing with private companies suspected of wrongdoing: “The biggest mistake people make is to be co-opted by management. The CFO will always have an answer for you as to why a certain number that looks odd really is normal, and why some development that looks negative is actually positive.”

The key exists in being continuously discerning when evaluating potential partnerships through ongoing due diligence. At its most basic level, this involves a relentless curiosity and implies checking multiple sources and asking questions, even uncomfortable and direct ones. By practicing rigorous due diligence and emphasizing transparency and long-term relationship building, stakeholders can make more informed decisions, mitigate risks, and raise the odds of favorable long-term deals.

To founders, I propose embracing the principle of “make it till you make it.” Create a solid foundation for your company and commit to building it up through genuine effort and perseverance rather than deception. You may fail, but that’s an opportunity to learn and improve in future endeavors.

Godfrey M. Bakuli is the Founder of Pioneer Strategy Group (PSG), which offers expert strategic advice and actionable execution plans to R&D and marketing leaders looking to identify, de-risk, and launch innovative business ventures. He is also the Founder and Managing Partner of The Mutoro Group, an investment firm employing a patient, disciplined, and rational approach to fundamental value investing. If you’d like to learn more about Pioneer Strategy Group, please email us at info@pioneerstrategy.co or through the link below.